Regulatory changes and technological advances have profoundly affected the competitive landscape of credit markets. In this paper, we investigate the role of information acquisition as a strategic tool for intermediaries to respond to competitive pressures. We specify a model in which the severity of asymmetric information between banks and borrowers varies with distance. Banks acquire borrower-specific information to both soften lending competition and to extend their market share by creating adverse-selection problems for their competitors. As the number of active banks grows, investments in information acquisition fall, leading not only to lower interest rates, but also to less efficient lending decisions. We also study the implications for industry consolidation, and show that merger waves in credit markets arise endogenously as a pure consequence of this strategic role for information.
Introduction
The recent evolution of financial intermediation has been characterized by rapidly increasing competition, both from traditional lenders such as commercial banks as well as from non-bank institutions that have expanded into credit markets. Much of this increased competition is the result of recent deregulation in the banking industry, such as the relaxation of restrictions on inter-state banking in the US or the Single Market in financial services in Europe, as well as technological advances, including automated credit scoring and other improvements in banks' data processing capabilities, all of which have allowed banks to enter and compete in markets in which they previously had no presence. At the same time, one of the most dramatic recent changes in credit markets has been an extended wave of consolidation among banks. Given the long-accepted view that information, both its generation and its distribution, is central to the working of financial markets in general and credits markets in particular, 1 these developments beg the question of how increased competition is likely to affect the role of financial intermediaries as producers of information.
Information that intermediaries generate about borrower quality is often relation-specific, so that certain banks enjoy an information-induced competitive advantage. 2 However, competition for borrowers, if unimpeded, tends to erode rents and relationship value. Faced with growing competitive pressures, we argue that intermediares have an incentive to acquire information in order to limit competition by creating a threat of adverse selection for their rivals. This strategic role of information has broad implications for the workings of credit markets through its effect on the pricing and the availability of credit, as well as the industry's incentives to consolidate.
To study these issues, we present a model where banks compete for borrowers by entering a loan market and investing in a screening technology that generates borrower-specific information.
In order to capture the varying degrees of informational expertise present in modern banking, we take the quality of the information-generation process to be decreasing in the distance between bank and borrower and increasing in the investments made by the intermediary. Banks compete for borrowers by deciding whether or not to screen a loan applicant and whether to make a loan offer and at what terms. Lastly, borrowers choose the bank with the best quote.
Our main contribution is to show that banks can use information acquisition as a strategic tool to respond to increasing competition. In particular, proprietary information serves a dual purpose. Not only does it soften price competion, but it also helps intermediaries to carve out a captive market. This latter effect highlights an important strategic use of information that, to the best of our knowledge, has not been studied before: by conducting credit assessments, banks are able to "poach" customers from competitors, thereby extending their market share. However, such attempts to steal competitors' business are tempered by the diminishing ability of intermediaries to generate borrower-specific information as they move away from their area of expertise.
A simple implication of our model is that both the availability and the pricing of credit should depend on the distance between banks and borrowers. Indeed, we find that borrowers located farther away from the bank that has screened them benefit from lower rates, but that lending decisions become less efficient as distance increases. The intuition for this finding is that, since banks are less able to obtain precise information for more distant loan applicants, these customers will be less informationally captured and hence will elicit greater competition from other lenders.
At the same time, the lower precision of credit screens implies that lending decisions will be less efficient.
Our analysis also sheds light on the likely effect of increased competition in credit markets. We show that more competition, by reducing intermediaries' rents, decreases their overall incentives to generate information and thereby affects both the pricing and the allocation of credit. This effect has two direct consequences. First, lending markets become more competitive because the reduction in private information for each bank implies that their competitors suffer less from adverse-selection problems. Second, however, less information production means that banks are more prone to make errors in their lending decisions as competition intensifies.
From a social-welfare perspective, information acquisition increases the efficiency of credit markets because it helps allocate funds to credit-worthy borrowers, but its benefits need to be weighed against its costs. Analyzing the welfare properties of the equilibrium, we find that banks devote too many resources on screening activities relative to the social optimum. This excess investment is a direct consequence of the strategic use of screening as a way of extending market share. In equilibrium, all banks follow the same strategy and ultimately overinvest in information acquisition without effectively increasing their captive market. These results suggest that policies that constrain banks' ability to invest in information may in fact increase social welfare by reducing the level of resources spent on these activities.
We also consider the consequences of mergers that allow banks to coordinate screening activities across branches. Specifically, we characterize conditions under which banks have an incentive to merge and, more importantly, show that those banks that remain independent benefit from the merger activity of their rivals. The reduction in informational investments by the merged entity allows independent competitors to capture market share from the merged banks and increase their own profitability. Nevertheless, we also find that independent banks' optimal response to a merger is for them to seek a merger partner as well, thus reducing inefficient overinvestments even further. In this context, our model provides new insights into the recent wave of consolidation in credit markets by showing that merger waves can arise endogenously as a consequence of banks' informationacquisition strategies. Furthermore, it suggests that, from a policy perspective, mergers may have the socially beneficial effect of reducing wasteful overinvestment in information.
Casting varying degrees of lending expertise in terms of differentiated information acquisition allows us to characterize the interdependence of banks' information-acquisition strategies and the industry's competitive structure, an issue that, to our knowledge, has not been studied. While some of our empirical predictions on loan pricing as a function of distance and number of competing banks resemble those from transportation-cost models (see, e.g., Chiappori et al., 1995) , our approach identifies a unique link between banks' strategies for investing in information and the degree of product differentiation that arises endogenously as a result of each bank's decisions. Hence, our analysis provides novel explanations for observed empirical regularities and identifies a new channel for strategic interaction in credit markets that traditional models of product differentiation or of banking competition cannot capture.
Recent literature has studied how differential information among intermediaries induces specialization in lending. For instance, Gehrig (1998) focuses on banks' incentives to produce information. Winton (1999) argues that banks may have an incentive to specialize if diversification were to lower their incentive to monitor borrowers and potentially increase their probability of failure. Closest to our work, Almazan (2002) analyzes a model in which a bank's monitoring expertise is a decreasing function of the distance between borrower and bank. In a similar vein, Chiesa (1998) analyzes the incidence of bank capital on loan screening and portfolio choice. This literature, however, does not consider the strategic role of information acquisition and, hence, does not endogenize the degree of product differentiation and industry structure.
Similar in spirit to our work, Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992) study borrowing under adverse selection, and show that relationship building may constrain competition in the refinancing stage.
In the context of credit worthiness tests, Broecker (1990) and Riordan (1993) both investigate the potentially negative effects of competition on loan markets under independent loan screening.
Dell'Ariccia (2001) shows that information can serve to carve out a market between competitor banks and to block entry. These papers do not, however, endogenize the generation of information, an issue that is central to this paper. This paper is also related to recent work on how increased credit market competition changes the incentives to forge banking relationships. In Boot and Thakor (2000) , increased capital market competition lowers ex ante bank profits and reduces entry into banking, leading to greater investment in relationship building. Dinc (2000) primarily focuses on how competition may increase the incentives for banks to maintain their good reputation by honoring loan commitments. We do not address bank reputation per se, but instead analyze rent generation in lending relationships and the equilibrium market structure. In our model, competition intensifies precisely because of increased entry into banking, causing banks' market shares to shrink.
From an empirical perspective, Petersen and Rajan (2002) have highlighted the link between geographical distance and bank-borrower relationships and find that distance seems to be a good, though over time declining, indicator of the strength of a lending relationship. Similarly, Degryse and Ongena (2004) find that loan rates decrease in the distance from lending bank to borrower but increase in the distance of borrower to competitor bank, as predicted by our analysis. Using industry specialization as an alternative way of measuring the distance between borrower and lender, Acharya, Hasan, and Saunders (2004) find strong evidence that a bank's informational effectiveness is lower in newly entered or more competitive sectors. As a result, lending in these sectors leads to lower loan quality which, in light of our results, would be a consequence of the higher threat of adverse selection in such markets.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a formal model of financial intermediation and information acquisition. Section 3 derives the lending equilibrium for a given information acquisition strategy that we use in Section 4 to characterize the overall credit-market equilibrium. Sections 5 and 6 analyze the welfare properties of the equilibrium and the conse-quences of merger activity, respectively. Section 7 discusses empirical implications and concludes.
Proofs are mostly relegated to the Appendix.
A Model of Locationally Differentiated Credit Assessment
Let a continuum of borrowers with mass M > 1 be uniformly distributed along a circle with circumference 1. Each potential borrower has an investment project that requires an initial outlay of $1 and that can be of either high (θ = h) or low (θ = l) quality. The projects of high-quality borrowers generate a terminal cash flow R > 0 with certainty, while those of low quality borrowers always fail, yielding 0. Final cash flows are observable and contractible, but project type θ is unknown to either borrower or lender. 3 The likelihood of finding a high-quality firm h is q ∈ (0, 1) and this distribution of borrower types is common knowledge. We also assume that borrowers have no private resources and that qR > 1, i.e., it is ex ante efficient to grant a loan. 4 N banks compete for these borrowers in three stages. First, banks decide whether or not to enter the loan market and to invest in a screening technology that generates borrower-specific information. We assume that if banks enter, they will locate equi-distantly around the circle.
Given their investment, banks next decide whether or not to screen a loan applicant. Credit assessments provide the screening bank with an informative signal η ∈ {l, h} about a borrower's type. Conditional on entry and any borrower-specific information, banks compete in the third stage by simultaneously offering loans at interest rates r ≥ 0, or may decide not to make such offers. Borrowers choose last by accepting a loan from the bank quoting the lowest rate. Figure 1 summarizes the model's time structure.
Information acquisition requires a costly investment in a screening technology. This investment allows intermediaries to gather customer-specific information through credit assessments at a perborrower cost c > 0. 5 Such credit screens yield a signal η ∈ {l, h} with quality φ that is defined in 3 Alternatively, we could assume that there are no self-selection or sorting devices such as collateral available because, for example, the borrower is wealth-constrained. 4 While M simply represents a scaling factor guaranteeing that at least two banks are active in equilibrium, we also restrict M and q jointly so that M (1 − q) ∈ 1, . This assumption ensures that banks will not have an incentive to engage in ruinous competition so that their profits are positive in equilibrium. A simple scaling of the cost function suffices to relax this assumption. 5 The magnitude of the screening cost c is not relevant for our results, as long as the cost of screening is not strictly zero. Otherwise, banks would always choose to screen loan applicants even if they could not profit from the information obtained. In analyzing the properties of the equilibrium, we will consider the limiting case where c → 0. 
We assume that the creditworthiness signal's quality φ increases in the bank's investment in screening effort or overall information-gathering expertise I, but is decreasing the borrower's distance x to the bank (see Figure 2 ). Specifically,
and 1 2 otherwise. Our specification captures the idea that banks enjoy an informational advantage in the market segments in which they operate, but that this expertise is reduced as banks seek to transact with customers located further away. As a result, banks can use discriminatory pricing as a function of distance so that their interest-rate offers can vary in the informational content of their credit screens.
The cost of the screening technology comprises a fixed component T and a variable component If more than one bank try to screen the same borrower, we assume that the bank with inferior expertise can only gather information about a better informed bank's borrower-specific knowledge.
In particular, if φ i (x) > φ j (y) for a borrower located at a distance x from bank i and y from bank j, we assume that bank j can only observe a noisy signal on the outcome of bank i's credit assessment.
Hence, we can think of the more informed bank as possessing not only all the information of any less-informed bank but also some private information. This assumption captures the notion that In contrast to other treatments of competition with differentiated products (e.g., Salop, 1979) , we use the concept of bank-borrower distance to model differential screening ability of intermediaries. In this context, we can think of bank location as representing expertise in a particular market segment, be it a specific geographic market, a particular industry, or a certain credit product. When banks branch out from their home market by, for instance, opening new branches in previously unserved market locations, acquiring intermediaries elsewhere, or expanding their customer base beyond a given industry or loan product, they often compete at a disadvantage to existing players in the market. Acharya et al. (2004) provide evidence that expanding into new markets or industries leads to higher levels of risk and erodes banks' informational capabilities.
In the context of relationship banking, costly screening can also serve as a metaphor for the time, effort, and resources that it takes to build lending relationships, and for the losses that a bank might incur during this period. 6 Hence, we can interpret the screening quality φ as the relative information advantage of the relationship bank over competitors rather than the absolute amount of information a particular lender has.
Lending Competition
We first derive the equilibrium in the lending game, for which the appropriate solution concept is Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. Starting with its last stage, each bank competes for borrowers with all competitor banks that entered the market. However, a standard feature of this class of models is that the equilibrium can be fully characterized by assuming that each bank competes only with its nearest neighbor on either side which is a consequence of the results in, e.g., EngelbrechtWiggans et al. (1983) . Hence, it suffices to study competition in the last stage for the case of two adjacent banks, one informed and one uninformed, vying for the business of borrowers located between them. We verify in the next section that this approach is indeed appropriate, as each borrower will be screened by at most one bank. By symmetry, both banks will be informed about some borrowers and uninformed about others so that we arbitrarily label one intermediary i for informed and the other one u for uninformed.
As has been demonstrated in similar contexts (see, e.g., Broecker, 1990 
Proof. See Appendix.
The lending game has an outcome reminiscent of Bertrand competition. Since, by definition, the uninformed lender has no private information about the borrower, it is unable to obtain any rents from the loans it grants. The informed bank, however, is able to use its informational advantage over competitors to extract rents from borrowers deemed to be of high quality. An informed bank's ability to distinguish good from bad risks allows it to adjust its bidding and lending strategy accordingly, and subjects less informed lenders to problems of adverse selection.
Proposition 1 also establishes that ex ante expected profits (prior to the observation of the screening signal η) are linear in the informativeness φ of the credit assessment and depend on borrower attributes, such as their distribution q. As the pool of borrowers worsens (a decrease in the fraction of high-quality applicants q), an informed bank earns higher profits on those borrowers with good signals. Behind this part of the proposition lies the adverse-selection problem faced by the uninformed bank because screening becomes more important the more low quality borrowers apply for credit.
Define β(y) to be the probability of receiving a competing loan offer from an uninformed bank.
We then have:
Proposition 2 Expected interest rates paid by both good and bad borrowers that receive a loan offer increase in the informativeness of the credit assessment φ:
The probability that an uninformed bank makes a loan offer to a borrower decreases in the information advantage of the informed bank:
As the quality of the credit assessment increases, informed banks can more easily filter out bad credit risks. Borrowers therefore become more informationally captured and as a result only receive loan offers at higher interest rates. Since better screening increases the threat of adverse selection, uninformed banks bid less aggressively by offering credit less frequently and raising their interest rate whenever they do make a loan offer. Taken together, these effects imply that expected interest rates paid by borrowers of both high and low credit quality increase in the precision of the signal obtained by the informed bank.
Corollary 1 Expected interest rates paid by both good and bad borrowers that receive a loan offer decrease in the distance x between the informed bank and the borrower:
Proof. The result follows from Proposition 2, ∂φ ∂x < 0, and an application of the chain rule.
Since the quality of information decreases in the distance x between the informed bank and the borrower, interest-rate offers must also be decreasing as a function of this distance. Conversely, keeping the distance between banks constant, expected offers are an increasing function of the distance between the uninformed competitor and the borrower. The intuition is simply that the closer a borrower is located to a competitor bank, the greater the adverse selection problem becomes for an uninformed bank. As the distance between the borrower and the informed bank increases, the screening bank's information advantage decreases, and the uninformed bank is able to bid more aggressively. The same effect is at work regarding the probability of a competing offer by an uninformed bank: the greater the distance between the uninformed bank and the borrower, the greater the relative informational advantage φ of the informed bank, and the less likely is an offer by an uninformed lender.
The finding in Degryse and Ongena (2004) that loan rates decrease in the physical distance between a corporate borrower and the lending bank but increase in the distance between the firm and competing banks provides evidence in support of this prediction. Note that, in equilibrium, we can also think of bank-borrower distance as capturing the duration of a lending relationship by taking x = x (t), x < 0, where t represent the length of time a particular firm has interacted with a given informed (i.e., relationship) lender. Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) report that interest rates increase in the duration of lending relationships t, which is again consistent with Proposition 2. As banks invest in borrower-specific information acquisition and become more informed over time, they may charge higher loan rates to informationally captured borrowers. 8 
Market Equilibrium and Screening Incentives
We now turn to the banks' decision to acquire information and the industry equilibrium. Since all banks are ex-ante symmetric, we focus throughout on a symmetric equilibrium in information acquisition, denoting a given intermediary by n ≤ N. We first verify that, in equilibrium, borrowers are not screened by multiple banks and characterize the marginal borrower screened by an intermediary. To this end, we define the marginal customer for which bank n has an informational advantage over its neighbor as
Lemma 1 In equilibrium, borrowers are screened by at most one bank. Intermediaries assess a
borrower's creditworthiness up to a maximal distancex n = min
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 1 is the foundation for our exploration of strategic information acquisition through a bank's choice of the marginal borrower it screens. The requirement thatx n be no greater than This lemma also justifies our analysis in the previous section of one informed bank competing against a number of uninformed ones. If more than one bank were to screen a borrower, competition among these banks would drive profits to zero for all but the most informed bank, and this bank alone could hope to recoup its screening cost c. As it would never pay to assess a borrower also screened by a better informed competitor bank, x n is also the borrower located the furthest away that bank n could profitably screen. For all other borrowers, bank n makes loan offers on an uninformed basis. One possible interpretation of such lending is that it represents transactional loans. In this context, Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 imply that every bank offers two types of loans in equilibrium: relationship lending based on the results of screening applicants located in its captive market and transactional lending outside this core segment.
We note that one can use the probability of a competing uninformed loan offer to measure not only the competitiveness of the market, but also the scope for multiple lending relationships. In our model, all borrowers obtain competitive loan offers from all banks, albeit with some probability that is decreasing in the quality of the screening bank's information. Accepting a competing offer from an uninformed lender can therefore be interpreted as the development of a second banking relationship. For instance, Detragriache, Garella, and Guiso (2000) find that in the U.S. nearly half of firms with less than 500 employees have only one banking relationship, suggesting that firms may be somewhat captive to their existing lenders, but that many of them in fact obtain loans from multiple lenders.
Furthermore, since the screening precision φ decreases in distance, the scope for multiple lending relationships increases in informed bank-borrower distance. Since in equilibrium only one bank will screen any given borrower, we note that this finding is consistent with interpreting the distance between loan applicant and screening bank as the age or size of firms. Under this interpretation, firms located farther away are the larger or older ones, which are more transparent due to the greater amount of publicly available information, so that the information advantage of the screening bank is relatively low. 9 By Proposition 2, borrowers located at roughly the same distance between two neighboring banks should attract more competition as intermediaries vie to establish lending relationships with these borrowers. Evidence on single vs. multiple lending relationships is consistent with this prediction. For instance, Farinha and Santos (2002) report that the likelihood of switching from single to multiple lending relationships increases with the firms' age.
Informational Investments
Given the number of banks N , an intermediary n will choose informational investments I n ∈ [0, 1] so as to maximize profits
where the first term represents the bank's total revenue from screening summed across all borrowers, and the second term is just total cost. Since we are interested in information acquisition in the face of increasing competition, we will assume that N is sufficiently large so that in equilibrium
, and banks cover the entire market. In equilibrium, each bank's captive market extends up tox n (I * n ) = 1 2N so that it screens all potential borrowers halfway to its nearest competitor (see Figure 3) . Subsequently, however, each bank faces competition at the lending stage from its uninformed rivals. By generating private information about borrowers, banks are not only able to make more efficient lending decisions, but they can also deter, or at least limit, competition from rival lenders. Hence, informational investments soften competition in the lending market.
Information acquisition also serves a second and distinct strategic purpose as intermediaries can try to extend their captive market through their investments in information. Specifically, each bank has an incentive to invest resources in an attempt to poach customers that are located closer to a competing bank. We therefore show that information acquisition provides a novel channel for the familiar "business-stealing" effects that have been observed in, for instance, the introduction of new products or advertising (see Tirole, 1988) . By increasing I, each bank hopes to encroach on its rival's captive market, thus increasing its profit and market share. While intermediaries do not succeed in extending their markets in equilibrium, their attempt to do so leads to overinvestment in information acquisition.
To see the importance of this effect, we compare the above equilibrium investment I * n to the case where banks enjoy a screening monopoly. Suppose banks were to collude and to agree ex ante not to steal each other's customers, but instead carve up the market equally and commit to screen only up to the halfway point to the nearest competitor. In this case, the maximization problem for each bank yields an optimal investment of I mon
represents a pure overinvestment in information acquisition that reduces each bank's profit even though it improves lending efficiency. We investigate the overall welfare implications in Section 5.
Proposition 3 also establishes intuitive comparative statics properties of the equilibrium. With more banks, investments in screening technology for each bank fall because more competition reduces the returns to information acquisition. When borrowers are on average of lower quality (a decrease in q), creditworthiness assessments become more important: as the risk of lending to a poor quality borrower grows, banks invest more in the screening technology, which helps them to avoid inefficient lending decisions.
Information Production and Competitive Loan Pricing
We now analyze the effect of competition on the expected interest rates paid by borrowers. As a direct consequence of Proposition 3, the equilibrium informativeness of credit screens (φ * n ) for all borrowers screened by a given bank decreases in the number of active banks: 
Proposition 4 Expected interest rates paid by both high and low quality borrowers that receive a loan offer decrease in the number of active banks:
Proof. By As entry reduces informational investments, an uninformed bank can compete more aggressively for a given loan applicant because it faces a diminished threat of adverse selection. The applicant's likelihood of receiving a competing loan offer rises and, by Proposition 2, the interest rates quoted fall with a decrease in φ. As a result, interest rates paid by both high and low-quality borrowers decline as the number of banks increases.
Similarly, we can investigate the effect of competition on the aggregate amount of information produced, which we can express as Φ (N ) = 2N
that aggregate information production decreases as the number of banks increases, so that more competition leads to less efficient lending decisions. 10 Hence, we would expect average interest rates paid by both good and bad credit risks to decline as the number of banks increases.
The preceding results suggest that increased competition is beneficial as it leads to lower interest rates paid on average. However, the more aggressive loan pricing results from a reduced incentive to invest in screening. While interest rates decline, banks also make less efficient lending decisions.
Free-Entry Equilibrium
We next establish the existence of a free-entry equilibrium and characterize the effect of changes in technological or regulatory barriers to entry into credit markets.
Proposition 5 There exists a free-entry equilibrium with N e > 0 active intermediaries and corresponding informational investments
thus leading to a decrease in the investment I * n .
A lowering of entry barriers, as represented by a reduction in fixed costs T , leads to a larger number of active banks, more competition for borrowers, and, consequently, lowers the returns to informed intermediation. The preceding proposition shows that credit markets respond to a reduction in entry costs by expanding the number of competitors, and that each bank optimally reacts by reducing its investments in information.
It is straightforward to show that the free-entry equilibrium number of banks is a function of both the cost of acquiring information and the severity of informational asymmetries, as measured by the fraction of bad credit risks 1 − q. The effect of the borrower distribution is subtle because 10 Broecker (1990) illustrates similar lending inefficiencies in the context of independent but symmetric creditworthiness tests. In his model, the probability that any given borrower passes at least one test increases with the number of banks that conduct N independent but noisy tests. However, in Broecker (1990) the aggregate amount of information increases with the number of banks even if the inference problem for each bank worsens. In our model, a reduced incentive to screen rather than an increased winner's curse drives the deterioration of overall credit quality. Shaffer (1998) provides some evidence that is consistent with both models: as the number of banks in a market grows, each bank's provision for loan losses increases.
it also affects the investment in information. As we showed in Proposition 1, an increase in the fraction of bad borrowers has a positive effect on bank profits for a given screening technology.
Hence, the market can support a greater number of banks when the distribution of borrowers is more skewed towards bad borrowers, so that the free-entry number of banks N e is increasing in the fraction of low quality borrowers 1 − q. 11 
Changes in Screening Technology
There has been much debate concerning the likely impact of changes in banks' ability to gather and process information on their capacity to establish and maintain relationships with borrowers. In a recent paper, Petersen and Rajan (2002) argue that increased access to information has eroded some of the geographic boundaries that have previously defined banking markets. This erosion has allowed banks to serve not only borrowers located further away, but also those that may not have previously appeared to have the observably highest quality. Similarly, Emmons and Greenbaum (1998) suggest that improved information processing ability may lead banks to offer credit to previously unserved or underserved customers, thus expanding the market. As Wilhelm (2001) observes, technological progress has allowed banks to leverage human capital to a point where far fewer loan officers are required for the management of portfolios of unchanged size. Hence, one would expect a corresponding decrease in the cost of screening or an increase in its informativeness.
While the complete analysis of advances in information technology is beyond the scope of this paper, we can offer some perspective on the preceding observations within the context of our model. Suppose one starts from a situation where regulatory barriers to entry, or costs of initial access to the information technology, are high in banking so that our fixed cost, T , is large. In this equilibrium, there are some borrowers who are never screened by any bank. These pure transactional market segments exist because entry has not yet pushed banks to encroach on each other's markets (i.e.,
). In this case, lowering the per borrower cost of screening c, which can be interpreted as an improvement in banks' credit assessment abilities and access to information, causes each bank's core market to expand (x n increases). Improving the informativeness of the signal φ through, for instance, better information processing capabilities or lower cost of investment, would have the same effect. 12 As a result of the improved ability to screen borrowers, banks should find it beneficial to screen and serve borrowers that were previously underserved.
The Social Value of Information
An important question is the extent to which a well-functioning credit market is likely to achieve a socially desirable outcome in terms of information production and the allocation of credit, an issue to which we now turn.
Availability of Credit and Lending Efficiency
We first consider how the ability of borrowers to obtain credit depends on the structure of the market. Efficient allocation of credit requires that high-quality applicants be able to obtain loans, while low-quality ones should be denied credit. Let O θ denote the probability that a borrower of type θ ∈ {l, h} obtains credit. For a high-quality borrower, the credit screen will yield a positive signal with probability φ, which also represents the probability that such an applicant obtains a loan offer from the screening bank. If the informed bank (wrongly) denies credit, a good borrower might still receive a loan with probability β from an uninformed bank. Hence, the probability of a loan offer for a high-quality borrower is O h = φ + (1 − φ)β, where, for notational simplicity, we suppress the dependence of φ and β on location.
A similar expression holds for low-quality borrowers that receive loan offers with probability
An increase in the quality of information φ will enhance lending efficiency if O h increases and O l decreases.
Lemma 2 The probability O h that a high-quality applicant receives a loan offer decreases in screen-
ing quality φ for φ <φ < 1, and increases for φ >φ. The probability O l that a low-quality applicant receives a loan offer unambiguously decreases in φ.
The probability O h that a good borrower obtains credit increases in the quality of information as long as this quality is beyond a certain thresholdφ. For values of φ below this threshold the consequences of adverse selection for the uninformed bank outweigh the more efficient lending decisions by the informed bank: the likelihood of obtaining an offer from an uninformed lender decreases more rapidly than the increase in the likelihood of getting an offer from an informed lender. Hence, the probability of a loan offer can decrease. When φ is sufficiently high, however, the probability that a high-quality applicant obtains credit unambiguously increases because the likelihood that the informed bank correctly identifies the borrower and makes a loan offer increases toward one as the credit assessment becomes perfectly informative (φ → 1).
For bad credit risks, the probability of obtaining a loan O l unambiguously decreases in φ for two reasons. First, an informed bank is able to identify the borrower more accurately and, second, an uninformed lender will also face a more severe adverse selection threat and hence is less likely to extend a loan offers. Hence, informational investments always decrease type II errors in credit assessments, but their effect on type I errors depends on the quality of information, which, ultimately, depends on the number of active banks.
For the following results, consider a given borrower located at a fixed distance x from the screening bank. Proof. The corollary follows from Proposition 2, ∂φ * n ∂N < 0, and an application of the chain rule.
With many active intermediaries, returns to screening are low, banks invest less in information production (see Proposition 3), and the equilibrium informativeness of screening φ * n can fall below the thresholdφ. In this situation, high-quality loan applicants would benefit from even more competition since they would be denied credit less frequently. Conversely, when screening is very profitable because only a small number of banks compete, the quality of the screens φ * n (N ) exceeds the thresholdφ and more competition reduces the probability of obtaining a loan for good borrowers.
For low quality borrowers, competition unequivocally increases their chance of obtaining credit, since it leads to less efficient lending decisions and thus a greater probability of a type II error.
Given that the efficiency of lending decisions decreases for low-quality applicants but that the effect is ambiguous for high-quality ones, we next study the incidence of competition on the social benefit of extending credit. This benefit is simply the sum of the expected surplus from lending to high-quality borrowers and the expected loss from inefficient lending to low-quality borrowers.
Again suppressing the dependence on borrower location x, the net surplus of any given lending decision is given by
Proposition 6
The expected social benefit of lending, w, increases in N for N >Ñ , and decreases otherwise, whereÑ is such that φ * n Ñ =φ for some thresholdφ < 1.
Proposition 6 shows that more competition is only beneficial when there are already many active banks. In this case, banks generate so little information that a further reduction in φ, which occurs when the number of banks increases, actually increases the probability that a good borrower obtains credit. This effect more than offsets the reduction in the screening out of bad risks. With little competition, however, an increase in the number of active banks actually decreases the expected surplus from lending since it reduces banks' informational investments: with screening quality φ sufficiently high, an increase in N reduces φ, leading to worse lending decisions.
The preceding results hold for a given borrower x. However, in light of our earlier observations on aggregate information production Φ, Proposition 6 suggests that these same results should also hold on aggregate. In other words, entry diminishes the efficiency of overall credit allocation for less competitive markets (a low number of active banks N ), whereas entry enhances efficiency for more competitive markets (high N ).
Information Production and Social Welfare
While the preceding analysis illustrates the social benefit of competition through its impact on the generation of information, it remains to be seen whether, absent external interference, a wellfunctioning credit market is likely to achieve such a socially desirable outcome. To this end, we compare the free-entry equilibrium investment to the level of screening that would be chosen by a social planner who does not interfere in the competitive structure of the market and therefore does not distort banks' incentives to lend. 13 Summing the lending surplus over all borrowers served by 13 Our approach is similar to Mankiw and Whinston (1986) .
all N intermediaries, we obtain the social welfare function as
We can decompose the preceding welfare expression into per-bank expected profits V n plus the expected surplus from lending in the absence of any private information, which is given by
β (x) (qR − 1) dx per bank. Note that the term B n is simply the ex-ante average surplus from granting a loan weighted by the probability that an uninformed bank makes a loan offer, summed over all borrowers. Summing across all banks, we then have
This expression for the aggregate lending surplus shows that any welfare effects must stem from banks' decision to invest in information acquisition and their use of that information in lending decisions. Pricing decisions, such as interest rates offered, represent a pure transfer between banks and borrowers and have no aggregate welfare implications. 14 
Proposition 7 In equilibrium, banks overinvest in information acquisition relative to the social optimum.
The preceding proposition verifies our earlier assertion that, in order to extend the reach of their captive market, banks invest excessively in information acquisition. While this investment does, in fact, enhance the informational transparency of credit markets and leads to better lending decisions, it is wasteful from a social perspective since its benefits are outweighed by the increase in costs.
From a policy perspective, our analysis suggests that limiting banks' informational investments may in fact be desirable. One possibility could be to grant banks exclusive screening rights in their captive markets so that they cut back on wasteful investment by spending I mon n < I * n . 15 Our results also suggest other remedies, such as the lowering of regulatory barriers to entry, combine their operations, but that banks 3 and 4 remain independent. As a consequence, the merged bank, which we call bank m, is able to coordinate screening activities between branches 1 and 2. Such coordination across branches allows each branch to commit to screening only half of the loan applicants, i.e., up to a distance 1 2N (see Figure 4) , thus avoiding business-stealing effects. For borrowers located between one of its branches and a stand-alone bank, the merged bank engages in competitive information acquisition as before, screening up to the marginal customer x m , which is defined in complete analogy tox n in Lemma 1. Since we wish to isolate the effect of information on banks' incentives to merge, we abstract from any scale economies and assume that the merged bank must incur the cost of investment at each of its branches, so that its overall cost is 1 2 I 2 m + I 2 m = I 2 m . Such scale effects would not alter our conclusions but would simply make mergers even more profitable. 16 Our results generalize to an arbitrary number of intermediaries as long as mergers occur between adjacent banks.
Branch 1 of merged bank
Marginal borrowerx sa Proof. See the Appendix. Figure 4 depicts the consequences of a merger between banks 1 and 2. By coordinating screening activities across its branches, the merged bank is able to reduce the inefficiency in its choice of investment since the incentive to capture greater market share is reduced. As a result, it invests less in information acquisition than in the fully competitive case (I * m < I * n ). The optimal strategy of the stand-alone banks, however, is to increase their informational investments to extend their captive markets, and as a consequence gain market share at the expense of the merged entity
). Both results are consistent with recent empirical evidence, such as that in Berger et al. (2004) , who find that smaller banks are better able to collect and process "soft" information than larger banks. Furthermore, Berger et al. (1998) report that newly merged banks tend to reduce small business lending but that this retrenchment is often more than offset by the competitive reaction of other banks.
Since the merged bank invests less and therefore obtains less precise information on average from its credit screens, Proposition 2 implies that expected interest rates paid by borrowers located in its market fall. Conversely, the informativeness of credit screens by the independent banks rises, so that borrowers in their markets pay higher interest rates. Such effects have indeed been identified in the context of bank consolidation as intermediaries have often defended their mergers by pointing to the potential benefits for customers arising from cost cutting and better coordination of activities.
Indeed, Berger, Rosen, and Udell (2001) find that, in the wake of industry consolidation, larger banks offer lower rates to small-business borrowers despite the well-documented finding that they also reduce the supply of credit to these borrowers. In our model, such benefits arise from more competition in lending because a reduction in screening investments increases the likelihood of competing loan offers, albeit at the cost of making less efficient lending decisions. Proposition 8 also shows that the merging banks benefit from consolidation when the average borrower quality is high, which occurs precisely when the overinvestment in screening resources is particularly wasteful. In this instance, some banks will have an incentive to merge in order to better coordinate their screening activities. Perhaps more surprisingly, we find that the independent banks benefit from the merger as well, since their optimal response is to increase their own investment and capture larger market shares. This increase in profitability of the stand-alone banks mirrors the findings of Deneckere and Davidson (1985) that mergers also benefit competitors in situations where firms compete in prices and produce differentiated products. Here, however, the benefit stems from changes in each bank's investment behavior, which affects the intensity of lending competition.
We next characterize the stand-alone banks' optimal response to their competitors' consolida-tion.
Corollary 3 Suppose that banks 1 and 2 have merged, and consider a merger between banks 3 and 4, leaving two "superbanks" (sb). The per-branch profits of the merged superbanks, V sb , are higher than those of the stand-alone banks (3 and 4): V
As Deneckere and Davidson (1985) show, independent firms left out of a merger are often able to free-ride on price increases by the merged firms, and therefore may not wish to respond by merging themselves. However, Corollary 3 establishes that per-branch profits of the independent banks increase even further if they combine operations once other banks have already merged. This finding stems from the fact that, in our model, the merger serves as a commitment device to reduce the level of overinvestment in information acquisition and therefore to compete less vigorously in the poaching of borrowers from the other merged bank. Hence, when the industry consolidates into two superbanks with two branches each, both the previously independent banks and the already merged entity reduce their respective informational investments to levels below those of the independent, competitive case. As a result, both remaining merged banks' profits increase as well.
Our results provide a new perspective on the occurrence of merger waves in the banking industry observed by, among others, Greenspan (1998) . In light of Proposition 7, the reduction in informational investments is welfare enhancing. Hence, encouraging mergers might be an additional policy response to the overinvestment in informational resources identified earlier. As the informativeness of credit screens fall, expected interest rates paid by borrowers also decrease. It is worthwhile to point out that this dynamic is a pure consequence of strategic information acquisition since, for comparability with the full competition case, we assume throughout that banks continue to compete against each other at the lending stage.
We also note that, as an alternative to mergers with adjacent competitors, banks could open multiple non-adjacent branches or combine forces with competitors that are not their neighbors.
To examine the consequences of branch proliferation, suppose that bank 1 were to merge with bank 3 (see Figure 4) , so that it has two branches at opposite ends of the circle. In this case, each branch of the merged entity faces competition from independent banks on each side. Hence, the merged bank cannot reduce its strategic investment in information acquisition for fear of losing some of its captive market through poaching from its neighbors. In this case, we are back in the fully competitive setting because there is no benefit to the merged bank of coordinating screening across branches.
Finally, it is also clear that a merger of two banks that reduces the location of the merged entity down to just one branch would not be profitable. In analogy to models of product differentiation, the bank's positioning at two separate locations allows it to retain at least part of its previous information monopoly, even as it coordinates to reduce inefficient investment. Consolidating the branches down to just one would lead to a loss of strategic flexibility that makes it more difficult for the bank to protect its core market. Similar issues have been studied in the literature on "flexible manufacturing" by, for instance, Eaton and Schmitt (1994).
Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we show how informational asymmetries concerning borrower quality lead to informational rents, whose magnitudes depend crucially on the extent of a lender's information advantage relative to its competitors. We use this framework to investigate how changes in the industry structure affect a bank's lending behavior and incentive to acquire information. By highlighting the role of asymmetric information and informational rent seeking as one of the underlying economic forces driving recent changes in the banking industry, we shed some light on the recent debate concerning the nature and future evolution of banking.
Our analysis delivers several empirical predictions. We find that expected interest rates decrease in bank-borrower distance, which is consistent with recent empirical findings regarding loan pricing in function of both physical distance between lenders and borrowers (Degryse and Ongena, 2004) and the duration of lending relationships (Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000) . We also find that more competition implies lower expected interest rates and reduced investment in information acquisition.
This reduction in informational investments, in turn, leads to less efficient credit allocation and a deterioration in aggregate loan quality.
In addition, our framework is useful for studying the likely effects of bank mergers, an important issue given the recent wave of consolidation in this industry. We find that the merger of competing banks may be beneficial for those intermediaries that remain independent, since their increased investment in information production allows them to gain market share at the expense of the merging banks. Berger et al. (2004) report that lending relationships are significantly shorter when firms borrow from larger banks, which corresponds to a smaller captive market for the merged bank in our model. We also find, however, that independent banks' optimal response to industry consolidation is for them to find merger partners as well. Our results therefore suggest a new explanation for merger waves in the banking industry based solely on the strategic use of information acquisition in competitive credit markets.
Incorporating location-specific asymmetric information into a model of spatial competition in banking provides unique insights not readily available from standard location-based models. Traditionally, such models have focused on transportation costs and uniform loan pricing (see Freixas and Rochet, 1997, for a survey). It is straightforward to show that a transportation-cost model of lending with discriminatory pricing but without asymmetric information yields very similar empirical predictions on interest rates as a function of distance and the number of active banks as those in our setting. 17 Hence, one could view such a model as a reduced-form representation of our framework rooted in informational asymmetries. However, since the degree of loan differentiation in terms of information content arises endogenously in our setting, our model can be used to analyze the link between banks' investments in building market share through informational investments and subsequent pricing and credit allocation decisions. These issues cannot easily be studied in models of bank competition where product differentation is exogenously imposed through, for instance, transportation costs. Our model also allows us to distinguish between information-based (e.g., "relationship") and uninformed (e.g., "transactional") lending and to extract empirical prediction simulatenously for both loan types in a unified framework.
Our analysis extends to other information-sensitive industries such as private equity, in partic- In light of our results, the strong specialization that we observe in private equity despite obvious diversification benefits comes as no surprise. If one interprets our screening investment ("effort")
variable I as core expertise, it simply means that many small players establish a particular niche of expertise in which they have higher success in identifying promising business opportunities.
In addition, the requisite human-capital investment discourages less informed competitors from competing for screened projects within the captive market of the VC. We could slightly extend our framework by including a slope coefficient in our screening-precision specification that captures how fast screening expertise decreases outside the core market. We would argue that such a slope coefficient is likely to be quite high in private-equity markets, yielding a correspondingly lower degree of competition. Bengtsson et al. (2002) provide empirical evidence that VCs screen less when competition for deal flow is intense, which, in our model, corresponds to an erosion of their market niche. However, a full analysis of the competitive dynamics of private-equity markets is beyond the scope of the present work.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof proceeds in a sequence of steps: first, we establish that there does not exist a pure strategy equilibrium. 18 Next, we show that the two competing banks offer loan rates over the same interval, then we verify that the mixed strategies are well-behaved distribution functions and, finally, we prove uniqueness by explicitly calculating the location dependent mixed strategies. As a preliminary step, we derive the success probability a potential borrower located at x conditional on the screening outcome η ∈ {l, h}. For terminal cash flow ξ, we obtain from Bayes' rule
To fix notation, let r q = q −1 and r l (x) = p(l; x) −1 .
Lemma 3 (Absence of Pure Strategy Equilibria) There exist no pure strategy equilibria in the bidding game for borrowers between an informed and an uninformed lender.
Proof. Let pure strategies conditional on signal and borrower location be denoted by r i (η) and r u for the informed and uninformed bank, respectively (we suppress the dependence on x for now).
Suppose that r u ≤ r i (h), r i (l). In order for this to be optimal for the uninformed bank, r u ≥ q −1 . However, the informed bank could increase its profit by offering a rate r i (h) = r u − and lending to all η = h borrowers. Therefore, r u ≤ r i (h), r i (l) cannot be an equilibrium. Suppose then that r i (h) ≤ r u ≤ r i (l). In this case, the uninformed bank only makes loans to η = l borrowers. In order for this to be optimal for the uninformed bank, it must be that r u ≥ p(l; x) −1 . If r i (h) < r u , the informed bank would be better off charging r i (h) + . But if r i (h) = r u , the uninformed bank would be better off charging a rate r i (h) − and lending to all borrowers. Therefore, r i (h) ≤ r u ≤ r i (l) cannot be an equilibrium.
Finally, suppose that r i (l) ≤ r u ≤ r i (h). At r u , the uninformed bank lends only to η = h borrowers and makes positive expected profits if r i (l) makes non-negative profits for the informed bank. But then, as above, if r u < r i (l), the informed bank could increase its profits strictly by lowering its bid to r u − and lending to all good borrowers. Therefore, this also cannot be an equilibrium, and no equilibrium exists in pure strategies. 
Definex as the value of x such that p(l; x)R = 1. We first consider a borrower located at x <x from the informed bank so that p(l; x)R < 1.
Claim 1 Both banks offer loan rates r i , r u ∈ q −1 , R . The informed bank makes positive profits on high-quality borrowers and does not offer loans to low-quality ones.
Obviously, the informed bank never bids on an η = l borrower, so that F i (r, l; x) = 0 for all x <x and all r. The uninformed bank will never bid less than r q = q −1 because low quality firms switch banks at any offer so that the loan pool has a success probability of at most q. But then, the informed bank will never offer rates below r q to its high quality customers (η = h) making positive profits on high-quality borrowers: π i (r, h; x) > 0. Clearly, neither the informed nor the uninformed bank will ever offer (gross) rates higher than R, the project's pay-off in the successful state. We first show that r i ≥ r u . If not, π i (r, h; x) = 0 for r ∈ (r u , r i ), contradicting an earlier result. Suppose then that the inequality is strict: r i > r u . In this case, π u (r i ; x) > π u (r u ; x), since the uninformed bank has the same probability of having the lowest rate at r i as at r u . Therefore, the two lower bounds must be the same.
If r u < r i then π i (r, h; x) = 0 on (r u , r i ] which contradicts π i (r, h; x) > 0 so that r i ≤ r u ≤ R. This also establishes that r u = R. If r h i < R, the uninformed bank would never choose to bid in r h i , R . But by an argument similar to that above, the informed bank would be better off raising its bid above r h i . Therefore, we must have that r h i = r u = R.
Claim 4 The uninformed bank breaks even:
Since F i (r, l; x) = 0, (7) simplifies to
which is continuous on [r u , r u ) by continuity of F i (r, h; x) . To show that the uninformed bank earns 0 expected profits, recall that r u = r i = r. Now, by definition,
then π u (r − ; x) = 0, since the probability of winning for this bank is zero. This implies that equilibrium expected profits must be zero. Suppose then that F i (r − , h; x) < 1. Since both banks cannot have an atom at r, we must have either that F u (r − ; x) = 1 or F u (r; x) < 1 and the uninformed bank sometimes refrains from bidding. Start with F u (r − ; x) = 1. In this case, this implies that π i (r − , h; x) = 0, contradicting the earlier result that π i (r, h; x) > 0 for all r ∈ supp(F i ).
Therefore, it must be that F u (r; x) < 1 and the uninformed bank sometimes does not bid. But this implies that its equilibrium expected profits must be zero. We can now calculate the lower bound. At r u , the uninformed bank wins almost surely, and so makes a profit of r u q − 1 = 0. This implies r u = q −1 . Hence, we can conclude that [r h i , r h i ) = [r u , r u ) = q −1 , R , which does not depend on x.
We now turn to the case of borrowers located at x >x from the informed bank.
Claim 5 If x >x the informed bank bids
; otherwise the informed bank would lose money. To show that r i (l; x) ≤ r l (x) suppose the contrary, i.e., that r i (l; x) > r l (x). By bidding r u = r i (l; x) − ε for small ε > 0, the uninformed bank would make strictly positive profits: while the worst expected type of borrower now is p(l; x), it wins with a positive probability. Hence, it must be that r u (x) < r i (l; x). However, the informed bank could similarly realize positive profits by bidding r i = r u (x) − δ for small δ > 0, contradicting the assumption that r i (l; x) > r l (x) is in the support of F i (r, l; x).
The remainder of the proof closely follows the case for x <x with minor modifications to give
, so that the upper bound depends on the borrower's location. Therefore, we conclude that for any To show strict monotonicity, suppose that F i (r, h; x) is constant on some interval (s, s) ⊂ [r q , r l (x) ∧ R). By continuity, π u is strictly increasing on the interval. This establishes the contradiction by Claim 4, since uninformed banks must always break even.
Monotonicity of F u is established by a completely analogous argument using the fact that π i must also be constant for F i strictly increasing.
Lemma 6 (Uniqueness) The mixed strategy equilibrium is unique; in particular the informed and uninformed banks make offers over [r q , r l (x) ∧ R) according to
Proof. Since the mixing distributions are strictly increasing by the preceding lemma, expected profits must be constant on [r q , r l (x) ∧ R). For π i (r, h; x) =π and π u (r; x) = 0, (6) and (8) yield the following system of equations defining the loan rate distributions:
Evaluating the first equation at the lower bound of the support shows that the constant isπ = p (h; x) r q −1. We can substitute into the above the definition of Pr (η = h) = φ(x)q +(1−φ(x))(1− q), which simplifies to Pr (η = h) = q−p(l;x) p(h;x)−p(l;x) . Solving out for F u and F i one finds
The preceding distributions represent the unique equilibrium of the competitive bidding game for a given borrower. As both banks randomize over the full support of the distribution functions they can not profitably deviate from their mixed strategies. This establishes uniqueness.
We now know that the equilibrium profits for both banks are the same for every interest rate offered in the support of the mixing distributions. In particular, at r = q −1 the informed bank wins with probability 1, but only bids if η = h, realizing a profit of
Since π i (r, l; x) = 0, this reduces to
This is well defined in that φ (x) ≥ 1 2 : E[π n (η, x)] ≥ 0, which establishes the expression for bank profits. Taking this result together with the preceding lemmata proves the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2. Pick any borrower and letr = min{r i , r u } be the expected interest rate paid if the borrower is deemed of high-quality (η = h) and obtains offers from both the informed and uninformed banks. Let F (r) be the distribution function ofr given by F (r) = F i (r, h) + F u (r) − F i (r, h)F u (r) suppressing the dependence on x for notational clarity. Expected interest rates for each borrower type θ ∈ {l, h} given that an offer is made are
q . (For ease of notation, we will henceforth drop the explicit conditioning on whether an offer has actually been made.)
For high-quality borrowers θ = h that receive a loan offer, the expected rate paid becomes
) and the definition of F (r) . Differentiating with respect to φ yields
so that the derivative's sign depends on the sign of g (φ) = 4φqR
which always holds by qR > 1 and g
> 0 as claimed. The expected rate paid by low-quality borrowers θ = l that receive a loan offer is
q . Let the probability that a bad loan-applicant obtains funding be O l = (1 − φ) + φβ so that the expression under the integral sign becomes
. We have that 
Hence, we find that expected interest rate of a low-quality applicant also increases in φ :
Proof of Lemma 1. We first show that for c > 0, borrowers are screened by at most one bank. Suppose that two bank i and j both screen a borrower located at a distance x from i and y from j. By assumption, if φ i (x) > φ j (y), bank i's signal is a sufficient statistic for bank j's. By an argument similar to that used in Proposition 1, profits in the subsequent competition stage would be zero for bank j. This occurs because, even though it is informed, its information is a subset of bank i's information set, and so the usual zero-profit result holds (for a discussion of this point, see Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al., 1983). If c > 0, bank j would not then recoup its cost of screening, and so, anticipating that bank i will screen, will not itself screen. Since, for any bank n, ex ante expected profits are given by E[π n (η, (3) with respect to I i and using the preceding expression forx i yields the following first order condition:
Imposing symmetry (I i = I j = I n ), letting c be small (c → 0) , and rearranging the FOC, we obtain the following equilibrium condition − T , so that V (I * n ) = 0 yields the free-entry equilibrium of active banks N e (up to integer constraints). Note that for N e to be well defined, we require M (1 − q) ∈ 1, Proof of Lemma 2. Given φ, the probability of a high-quality applicant obtaining a loan offer is O h = φ + (1 − φ)β, so that 1 − O h is the probability of not obtaining credit. Then
Since φ ≥ We can differentiate the preceding profits expressions, and impose symmetry for the independent banks, so that after letting the screening cost c go to zero, we obtain Repeating the preceding analysis, we find that both superbanks invest I * sb =
3M (1−q)
N (4−M (1−q)) at each branch, which is lower than I * m and I * sa . Since
by our usual restriction, we note that banks have an incentive to simultaneously merge in pairs regardless of the distribution of borrowers. Finally,
(1 − q) − 64 < 0, which is satisfied given that M (1 − q) ∈ 1, 4 3 . Therefore, the best response to a merger is for the stand-alone banks to merge as well.
